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Abstract
We consider a stochastic game-theoretic model of a discrete-time asset market
with short-lived assets and endogenous asset prices. We prove that the strategy
which invests in the assets proportionally to their expected relative payoffs asymp-
totically minimizes the expected time needed to reach a large wealth level. The re-
sult is obtained under the assumption that the relative asset payoffs and the growth
rate of the total payoff during each time period are independent and identically
distributed.
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1. Introduction
One of classical problems in mathematical finance consists in finding an investment
strategy which reaches a given wealth level as quick as possible. It is generally known
that in market models with exogenously specified asset prices log-optimal strategies
asymptotically minimize the expected time of reaching a large wealth level, at least
when asset returns are specified by i.i.d. random variables; see e.g. the seminal paper [7]
for a result in discrete time, or a more recent work [16] for a continuous-time model with
Le´vy processes. In the present paper we obtain an analogous result for a game-theoretic
model of a market with endogenous prices – an asset market game.
We consider a discrete-time model in which assets yield random payoffs that are
divided between agents (investors) proportionally to the number of shares of each asset
held by an investor. Asset prices are determined endogenously by an equilibrium of
supply and demand and depend on investors’ strategies. As a result, the evolution of
investors’ wealth depends not only on their own strategies and realized asset payoffs
but also on strategies of the other investors in the market. Our goal is to identify an
investment strategy that allows an investor to reach a large wealth level asymptotically
not slower, on average, than any other investor in the market. We show that there exists
a strategy with this property, and, moreover, it does not depend on the strategies used
by the other investors.
This research was motivated by results in evolutionary finance – the field which
studies financial markets from a point of view of evolutionary dynamics and investigates
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properties of investment strategies like survival, extinction, dominance, and how they
affect the distribution of wealth; recent reviews of this direction can be found in [10, 14].
We will work within the evolutionary model of a market with short-lived assets proposed
by Amir et al. [3] (among earlier models of a similar structure one can mention, e.g.,
[6, 11, 13]). Short-lived assets can be purchased by investors at time t, yield payoffs at
t+ 1, and then the cycle repeats. They have no liquidation value, so investors can get
profit or loss only by receiving asset payoffs and paying for buying new assets. Certainly,
such a model is a simplification of a real stock market, however models with short-lived
assets have been widely studied in the literature because they are more amenable to
mathematical analysis and ideas developed for them may be transferred to more realistic
models.
The main results of the present paper are related to the strategy λ∗ of [3], which splits
an investment budget between assets proportionally to their expected payoffs. In that
paper, it was shown that λ∗ is a survival strategy in the sense that it allows investors
using it to keep their relative wealth (the share in the total market wealth) bounded
away from zero on the whole infinite time interval with probability 1. As observed in
[3], in view of such a structure, this strategy is analogous to the Kelly rule of “betting
one’s beliefs” in markets with exogenous asset prices (see [17]; a collection of papers
on the Kelly rule can be found in [20]). Moreover, the key step to show that λ∗ is a
survival strategy was to prove that it makes the logarithm of the relative wealth of an
investor who uses it a submartingale, which is analogous to the log-optimality property
in markets with exogenous prices (see, e.g., [1], or later literature where such strategies
are often called growth-optimal, benchmark, or nume´raire portfolios, [15, 18, 21]).
Our first main result shows that the expected time needed for an investor using λ∗
to reach a wealth level l is asymptotically, as l → ∞, not greater than the same time
for any other investor in the market, i.e. if we denote these times by τ∗l and τl, then
ξ := lim supl→∞E τ
∗
l /E τl ≤ 1. Compared to [3], where no conditions on the distribution
of asset payoffs are imposed, we require that the payoffs are generated by sequences of
i.i.d. random variables in a certain way, which is a usual assumption in various settings
of time minimization problems in asset market models (cf., e.g., [7, 16]), as well as in
earlier works in evolutionary finance.
The second main result states that, under some additional conditions, the strict
inequality ξ < 1 takes place if the strategy of the other investor is essentially different
from λ∗ in some sense, and we find an upper bound for ξ which is strictly less than 1. It
is interesting to note that, among its assumptions, this results requires the payoffs to be
strictly random, and we provide a counterexample with non-random asset payoffs where
ξ = 1. In other words, volatility, which we associate here with randomness of payoffs,
helps λ∗ to beat other strategies (see further discussion in Section 3).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 states
the main results, and Section 4 contains their proofs.
2. The model
The model we use is essentially equivalent to that of [3], but it will be more convenient
to formulate it using the notation which is more common in stochastic analysis.
For ease of exposition, let us first briefly describe the structure of the model in plain
language. The market consists of M ≥ 2 agents (investors) and N ≥ 2 assets. At
each moment of time t = 1, 2, . . . , the assets yield random payoffs, which are divided
between the investors proportionally to the number of shares of each asset purchased
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by an investor at time t − 1. The supply of each asset is given exogenously (and,
without loss of generality, is normalized to 1), while the demand depends on actions
of the investors, i.e. their investment strategies. An investment strategy consists of
an investor’s decisions, made at every moment of time simultaneously with the other
investors and independently of them, on what proportion of wealth to spend on buying
each asset. Asset prices are determined by means of the market clearing mechanism,
i.e. they are set in such a way that the demand becomes equal to the supply. Then,
at the next moment of time, the assets purchased by the investors yield payoffs and
the cycle repeats. The important simplifying modeling assumption consists in that the
assets bought at time t− 1 cannot be sold at t, i.e. they disappear after yielding payoffs
without any liquidation value and are replaced by their “copies”. Hence, we can say
that they live for just one period and call them short-lived.
To define the model formally, introduce a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with a filtration
F = (Ft)∞t=0. Payoffs of asset n = 1, . . . , N are specified by a sequence of random
variables Xnt ≥ 0, t ≥ 1, which is F-adapted (i.e. Xnt are Ft-measurable). It is assumed
that Xnt are given exogenously, i.e. do not depend on actions of the investors, and that∑
nX
n
t > 0 for all t ≥ 1 (hereinafter all equalities and inequalities for random variables
are assumed to hold with probability 1).
The wealth of investor m = 1, . . . ,M is specified by an adapted random sequence
Y mt ≥ 0. The initial wealth Y m0 of each investor is non-random and strictly positive.
Further evolution of wealth depends on the investors’ actions and the asset payoffs.
Actions of investor m are represented by a sequence of vectors of investment proportions
λmt = (λ
m,1
t , . . . , λ
m,N
t ), t ≥ 1, according to which this investor allocates the available
budget Y mt−1 for buying assets at time t− 1. Short sales are not possible and the whole
wealth is reinvested, so the vectors λmt belong to the standard N -simplex ∆ = {λ ∈
R
N
+ :
∑
n λ
n = 1}.
To allow dependence on a random outcome and the history of the market, we define
a strategy of an investor as a sequence of functions
Λt(ω, y0, λ1, . . . , λt−1) : Ω× RM+ ×∆M(t−1) → ∆, t ≥ 1,
which are Ft−1⊗B(RM+ ×∆M(t−1))–measurable (B stands for the Borel σ-algebra). The
argument y0 ∈ RM+ corresponds to the vector of initial wealth Y0 = (Y 10 , . . . , Y M0 ). The
arguments λs = (λ
m,n
s ), m = 1, . . . ,M , n = 1, . . . , N , s = 1, . . . , t − 1, are investment
proportions selected by the investors at the past moments of time (for t = 1, the function
Λ1(ω, y0) does not depend on λs). If this strategy is used by investor m, then the
value of the function Λt corresponds to the vector of investment proportions λ
m
t . The
measurability of Λt in ω with respect to Ft−1 means that future payoffs are not known
to the investors at a moment when they decide upon their actions.
After the investors have chosen their investment proportions at time t− 1, the equi-
librium asset prices pnt−1 are determined from the market clearing condition that the
aggregate demand of each asset is equal to the aggregate supply, which is normalized
to 1. Since investor m can buy xm,nt = λ
m,n
t Y
m
t−1/p
n
t−1 units of asset n, we must have
pnt−1 =
M∑
m=1
λm,nt Y
m
t−1.
If
∑
m λ
m,n
t = 0, i.e. no one invests in asset n, we put x
m,n
t = 0 for all m; in this case the
price pnt−1 = 0 can be defined in an arbitrary way with no effect on the investors’ wealth,
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so we will put pnt−1 = 0 for convenience. At the next moment of time t, the total payoff
received by investor m from the assets in the portfolio will be equal to
∑
n x
m,n
t X
n
t .
Consequently, the wealth sequence Y mt is defined by the recursive relation
Y mt (ω) =
N∑
n=1
λm,nt (ω)Y
m
t−1(ω)∑
k λ
k,n
t (ω)Y
k
t−1(ω)
Xnt (ω), (1)
where λm,nt (ω) denotes the realization of investor m’s strategy in this market, which is
defined recursively as the sequence
λm,nt (ω) = Λ
m,n
t (ω, Y0, λ1(ω), . . . , λt−1(ω)). (2)
Equation (1) expresses the wealth dynamics of an individual investor in the market.
Observe that Y mt implicitly depends on the strategies of the other investors. At the
same time, if some investor m uses a fully diversified strategy, i.e.
λm,nt > 0 for all t, n, (3)
then Y mt > 0 for all t and the total market wealth, which we will denote by Wt =∑
m Y
m
t , does not depend on the investors’ strategies and is equal to
∑
nX
n
t .
Remark 1 (On extensions of the model). The main features of the model which consid-
erably simplify its mathematical analysis are that (a) the assets are short-lived, (b) the
whole wealth is reinvested and there is no risk-free asset, (c) there are no short-sales, and
(d) the time runs discretely. There is a number of papers where these assumptions are
relaxed. Among them, one can mention, for example, [2], [5, 9], [4], [23] which address,
respectively, the limitations (a), (b), (c), (d). However, to my knowledge, there is no
general model which would combine all these extensions together.
3. Main results
For a number l > 0, let τml denote the stopping time when the wealth of investor m
reaches or exceeds the level l for the first time, i.e.
τml = min{t ≥ 0 : Y mt ≥ l},
where min ∅ = ∞. We are interested in finding a strategy which makes E τml small
compared to other strategies asymptotically as l→∞.
Our first result, Theorem 1 below, provides such a strategy in an explicit form. We
will prove it under the following assumption on the payoff sequences.
Assumption (A). The sequences Xnt can be represented in the form
Xn1 = ρ1R
n
1
M∑
m=1
Y m0 , X
n
t = ρtR
n
t
N∑
i=1
Xit−1, t ≥ 2,
where
(A.1) ρt > 0 is an adapted sequence of identically distributed random variables such
that E(ln ρt)
2 <∞, E ln ρt > 0, and ρt are independent of Ft−1 for all t;
(A.2) Rt = (R
1
t , . . . , R
N
t ) is an adapted sequence of random vectors with values in ∆
and there exists ε > 0 such that E(Rnt | Ft−1) ≥ ε for all n and t.
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The sequences ρt and Rt have a rather clear interpretation. Indeed, ρt expresses the
growth rate of the total payoff (
∑
nX
n
t = ρt
∑
nX
n
t−1), and R
n
t = X
n
t /
∑
iX
i
t are the
relative payoffs of the assets. Observe that if (3) holds, then Wt =
∑
nX
n
t = ρtWt−1,
and (A.1) implies that limt→∞Wt =∞ by the strong law of large numbers.
Introduce the following strategy Λ∗, which depends only on t and ω, and has the
components
Λ∗,nt ≡ λ∗,nt = E(Rnt | Ft−1).
Note that this is the same strategy as λ∗ in [3].
Theorem 1. Let Assumption (A) hold and suppose investor 1 uses the strategy Λ∗.
Then E τ1l <∞ for any l > 0, and for any other investor m ∈ {2, . . . ,M}
lim sup
l→∞
E τ1l
E τml
≤ 1. (4)
This theorem shows that no investor can reach a wealth level l faster asymptotically
(as l → ∞) than an investor who uses the strategy Λ∗. The next theorem strengthens
inequality (4) if the other investor uses an essentially different strategy. We will estab-
lish it for the case of two investors in the market and when the following additional
assumption holds.
Assumption (B). The sequence of vectors Rt from Assumption (A) is such that
(B.1) Rt are identically distributed and independent of Ft−1 for all t;
(B.2) Rt have linearly independent components, i.e. if
∑
n c
nRnt = 0 a.s. for c ∈ RN ,
then c = 0.
Observe that if this assumption holds, then the strategy Λ∗ is constant and λ∗,nt =
λ∗,n = E(Rn1 ) > 0 for all t and n, where the inequality follows from (A.2). For a > 0,
introduce the function
f(a) = sup
{
E ln
N∑
n=1
λnRn1
λ∗,n
∣∣∣∣∣ λ ∈ ∆ and ‖λ− λ∗‖ ≥ a
}
,
where we put f(a) = −1 if the set under the supremum is empty. If this set is non-empty
(i.e. a is small enough), then it is compact, so the supremum is attained since the above
expectation is upper semicontinuous in λ as follows from the Fatou lemma. Moreover,
by Jensen’s inequality, for any λ ∈ ∆, we have E ln∑n λnRn1/λ∗,n < 0. The inequality
is strict because the logarithm is strictly concave and
∑
n λ
nRn1/λ
∗,n is non-constant as
follows from (B.2). Consequently, f(a) < 0 for any a > 0.
Theorem 2. Let M = 2 and Assumptions (A), (B) hold. Suppose investor 1 uses the
strategy Λ∗ and investor 2 uses a strategy Λ˜t such that its realization λ˜t = λ˜t(ω) satisfies
the inequality ‖λ˜t − λ∗‖ ≥ a a.s. for all t ≥ 1 with some a > 0, and λ˜nt are uniformly
bounded away from zero (i.e. λ˜nt > ε˜ for all t, n and some ε˜ > 0).
Then, with θ = E ln ρ1 > 0, we have
lim sup
l→∞
E τ1l
E τ2l
≤ 1− |f(a)| ∧ θ
θ
. (5)
Note that the assumption about only two investors, M = 2, is not too restrictive. In
the case M ≥ 3, the above theorem can be used if one replaces investors m = 2, . . . ,M
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with the representative investor and let λ˜ be the realization of the strategy of this new
investor (see (8)–(10) below). Since the time needed for an individual investor m ≥ 2 to
reach a given wealth level is not less than the same time for the representative investor,
inequality (5) will remain valid if τ2l is replaced by τ
m
l .
Inequality (4) generally cannot be improved if Assumption (B.2) does not hold. In
Example 1 below, we demonstrate this for the case when Rt are non-random. This fact
can be compared with the known phenomenon of volatility-induced growth in models
with exogenous asset prices, which consists in that a constant proportions strategy can
achieve a growth rate strictly greater than the growth rate of any asset, if the relative
prices are non-constant. If the relative prices are constant this effect disappears, which
may seem counter-intuitive since usually randomness (or volatility) is regarded as an
impediment to financial growth. A popular intuitive explanation of this phenomenon
consists in that a constant proportions strategy “buys low and sells high” (see, e.g., [12]
or Chapter 15 in [19]), but such an explanation have known flaws [8].
Example 1. Suppose W0 = 1 and the asset payoffs are non-random and given by
Xnt = R
nρt, (6)
where ρ > 1, R ∈ ∆ with Rn ≥ ε for all n and some ε > 0. Clearly, this model satisfies
Assumptions (A) and (B.1), and the strategy Λ∗ is of the form Λ∗t = R for all t.
Proposition 1. Suppose in model (6) investor 1 uses the strategy Λ∗ and investor 2
uses some constant strategy Λ˜t = λ˜. Then
lim
l→∞
τ1l
τ2l
= 1.
4. Proofs
We begin with two simple lemmas, which will be needed in the proofs. Throughout this
section, for a vector x ∈ RN we will denote its L1 and L2 norms by |x| =∑n |xn| and
‖x‖ = (∑n(xn)2)1/2 .
Lemma 1. Suppose x, y ∈ RN have strictly positive coordinates and |x| = 1. Then
N∑
n=1
xn(lnxn − ln yn) ≥ 1
4
∥∥∥∥x− y|y|
∥∥∥∥2 − ln |y|. (7)
One can see that this lemma follows from a known inequality for the Kullback-
Leibler divergence if x and y/|y| are considered as probability distributions on a set of
N elements. A short direct proof of (7) can be found in [3] (see there Lemma 2, which
is proved for |y| = 1, but easily implies our case as well).
Lemma 2. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)∞t=0,P) be a filtered probability space. Suppose Xt, t ≥ 1, is an
adapted sequence of identically distributed random variables such that Xt is independent
of Ft−1 and EX2t < ∞ for all t ≥ 1. Denote µ = EXt, σ2 = VarXt. Then for any
stopping time τ ≥ 1
EXτ ≤ µ+ 2σ
√
E τ .
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Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume µ = 0 and E τ < ∞. Introducing the
martingale Mt =
∑
s≤tXs, we obtain
EXτ ≤ E(Mτ −min
s≤τ
Ms I(τ > 1)) ≤ ‖min
s≤τ
Ms‖L2 ≤ 2
∥∥∥∥(∑
s≤τ
X2s
)1/2∥∥∥∥
L2
= 2σ
√
E τ ,
where in the second inequality we applied Wald’s identity EMτ = 0, in the next one the
Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality, and then Wald’s identity again (see, e.g., Chap-
ter 7 of [22] for these results).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us first show that the proof can be reduced to the case when
M = 2 by replacing investors 2, . . . ,M with a representative investor. Let rmt = Y
m
t /Wt
denote the relative wealth of the investors and define
Y˜t =
M∑
m=2
Y mt , λ˜
n
t =
M∑
m=2
rmt−1
1− r1t−1
λm,nt , (8)
where λm,nt = λ
m,n
t (ω) are the realizations of the strategies defined in (2), and we
put λ˜nt = 0 when r
1
t−1 = 1. Since λ
∗,n
t > 0 for all n by Assumption (A.2), we have
Wt =
∑
nX
n
t > 0, so r
m
t are well-defined. Denote
τ˜l = min{t ≥ 0 : Y˜t ≥ l} (9)
and observe that τ˜l ≤ τml for any m ≥ 2. Also, it is straightforward to check that the
wealth sequence of investor 1 satisfies the relation
Y 1t =
N∑
n=1
λ∗,nt Y
1
t−1
λ∗,nt Y
1
t−1 + λ˜
n
t Y˜t−1
Xnt , (10)
which is precisely relation (1) in the case of two investors who have the wealth Y 1t , Y˜t
and use the strategies Λ∗t , Λ˜t = λ˜t(ω), while τ˜l is the first moment when the wealth of
the second investor reaches or exceeds l. Consequently, to prove the theorem, it would
be enough to show that
lim sup
t→∞
E τ1l
E τ˜l
≤ 1.
So, from now on we will deal with the case M = 2. For brevity of notation, we will
denote the realizations of strategies and the wealth of the first and the second investors,
respectively, by λt (= λ
∗
t ), Yt and λ˜t, Y˜t; their relative wealth will be denoted by rt and
r˜t = 1− rt, and the moments of reaching or exceeding a wealth level l by τl and τ˜l.
From (10), we find
rt
rt−1
=
N∑
n=1
λnt
rt−1λnt + r˜t−1λ˜
n
t
Rnt . (11)
Denoting βnt = rt−1λ
n
t + r˜t−1λ˜
n
t , we obtain the relation
E(ln rt | Ft−1)− ln rt−1 ≥ E
(
N∑
n=1
Rnt ln
λnt
βnt
)
=
N∑
n=1
λnt (lnλ
n
t − ln βnt ) ≥ 0, (12)
where in the first inequality we used the concavity of the logarithm, in the second one
that λnt = E(R
n
t | Ft−1), and in the last inequality applied Lemma 1 to the vectors λt
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and βt. Inequality (12) implies that ln rt is a submartingale (the integrability of ln rt
follows from that rt ≥ rt−1minn λnt ≥ εrt−1, which can be seen from (11)). In passing,
observe that since this submartingale is non-positive, with probability 1 there exists
the finite limit limt→∞ ln rt, so inft≥0 rt > 0. This property allows to call Λ
∗ a survival
strategy, i.e. an investor “survives” in the market by keeping a share of wealth bounded
away from zero. This result was proved in [3] for general payoff sequences (note that in
earlier papers, e.g. [6], the term “survival” has a somewhat different meaning).
If E τ˜l <∞, we find
ln l ≤ E ln Y˜τ˜l = E(ln r˜τ˜l + lnWτ˜l) ≤ E lnWτ˜l = θE τ˜l + lnW0, (13)
where in the last equality we applied Wald’s identity to the sequence of i.i.d. random
variables ln(Wt/Wt−1) = ln ρt. Here, as in Section 3, θ = E ln ρ1.
Inequality (13) gives us the lower bound E τ˜l ≥ θ−1 ln(l/W0). Then we would like
to obtain an upper bound for E τl of the same order. To do that, we will work with a
slightly altered sequence λ˜t, which we will define now.
Let ε > 0 be the constant from Assumption (A.2) and put δ = ε2/256. Define
recursively the sequences r′t, t ≥ 0, and λ˜′t, t ≥ 1, by the relations
r′0 = r0,
λ˜′t = λ˜t + δλt I(minn
λ˜nt ≤ ε/2, r′t−1 ≤ 1/2), t ≥ 1,
r′t =
N∑
n=1
λnt r
′
t−1
λnt r
′
t−1 + λ˜
′n
t (1− r′t−1)
Rnt , t ≥ 1. (14)
By induction, one can check that r′t ≤ rt. Put Y ′t = r′tWt and τ ′ = min{t ≥ 0 : Y ′t ≥ l}.
Then we have τl ≤ τ ′, so we will look for an upper bound for E τ ′.
Similarly to (12), we can show that ln r′t is a submartingale. Indeed, let β
′
t = r
′
t−1λt+
(1− r′t−1)λ˜′t. Then
E(ln r′t | Ft−1)− ln r′t−1 ≥
N∑
n=1
λnt (ln λ
n
t − ln β′tn) ≥
1
4
∥∥∥∥λt − β′t|β′t|
∥∥∥∥2 − ln |β′t|. (15)
On the event {λ˜′t = λ˜t} we have |β′t| = 1, so the right-hand side of (15) is non-negative.
On the event {λ˜′t = λ˜t + δλt}, there exists a coordinate n = n(ω) such that λ˜nt ≤ ε/2,
so, using that |β′t| = 1 + δ(1 − r′t−1) ≤ 1 + δ, we can estimate ln |β′t| ≤ δ and∥∥∥∥λt − β′t|β′t|
∥∥∥∥ ≥ 1− r′t−1|β′t| (λnt − λ˜nt ) ≥ ε8 .
Then the choice of δ implies that the right-hand side of (15) is non-negative on the event
{λ˜′t = λ˜t + δλt} as well. Thus, ln r′t is a non-positive submartingale, and, in particular,
inft≥0 r
′
t > 0. Since Wt →∞, we also have τ ′ <∞.
From now on, assume that l > Y0 (since we take l →∞). Applying Fatou’s lemma,
we obtain
ln l ≥ lim sup
t→∞
E lnY ′τ ′∧t−1 = lim sup
t→∞
E
(
lnWτ ′∧t − ln ρτ ′∧t + ln r′τ ′∧t − ln
r′τ ′∧t
r′τ ′∧t−1
)
.
By Wald’s identity, E lnWτ ′∧t = θE(τ
′ ∧ t) + lnW0. From Lemma 2, E ln ρτ ′∧t ≤
θ+2σ
√
E(τ ′ ∧ t), where σ2 = Var(ln ρ1). Since ln r′t is a submartingale, E ln r′τ ′∧t ≥ ln r0.
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Finally, for all t ≥ 1 we have r′t ≤ r′t−1/(δε). Indeed, if r′t−1 > 1/2 this is obvious, while if
r′t−1 ≤ 1/2 we can use (14) and the inequalities λnt ≥ ε ≥ δε and λ˜
′n
t ≥ min(ε/2, δλnt ) ≥
δε to find
r′t ≤
N∑
n=1
r′t−1
λnt r
′
t−1 + λ˜
′n
t (1− r′t−1)
Rnt ≤
r′t−1
δε
.
Consequently, we obtain the inequality
ln l > lim sup
t→∞
(
θE(τ ′ ∧ t)− 2σ
√
E(τ ′ ∧ t)
)
− θ + lnW0 + ln r0 + ln(δε).
Applying the monotone convergence theorem, we can see that E τ ′ should be finite, and
hence
ln l ≥ θE τ ′ − 2σ
√
E τ ′ − θ + ln(Y0δε). (16)
Now the claim of the theorem follows from (13), (16), and the relation E τl ≤ E τ ′.
In the following proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, we will use the same no-
tation for investors 1 and 2 as in the proof of Theorem 1, i.e. without and with tilde,
respectively.
Proof of Theorem 2. We can assume that E τ˜l < ∞ for all l > 0, as otherwise the
proof becomes trivial. Let us begin with an auxiliary estimate. For c ∈ [0, 1) we define
ηc =
∑
t≥0 I(rt < c) and will now show that E ηc < ∞. As was shown in the proof of
Theorem 1, ln rt is a non-positive submartingale. If we denote by Ct its compensator,
i.e. the non-negative and non-decreasing sequence
Ct :=
t∑
s=1
E
(
ln
rs
rs−1
∣∣∣∣ Fs−1),
then Ct a.s.-converges to a limit C∞ with EC∞ <∞. This follows from the monotone
convergence theorem since ECt = E ln(rt/r0) ≤ − ln r0. Using Lemma 1, similarly to
(12) and (15), we see that (with the same βt as in (12))
C∞ ≥ 1
4
∞∑
t=1
‖λ− βt‖2 = 1
4
∞∑
t=1
(1− rt−1)2‖λ− λ˜t‖2 ≥ a
2
4
∞∑
t=1
(1− rt−1)2. (17)
Therefore, ηc ≤ 4C∞/(a(1− c))2, so E ηc <∞.
From (11), we find
r˜t
r˜t−1
=
N∑
n=1
λ˜nt
λnrt−1 + λ˜nt r˜t−1
Rnt ,
which implies
E
(
ln
r˜t
r˜t−1
∣∣∣∣ Ft−1) ≤ E(ln N∑
n=1
λ˜nt R
n
t
λnrt−1
∣∣∣∣ Ft−1) ≤ f(a)− ln rt−1.
Since rt is a submartingale, we have E(ln(r˜t/r˜t−1) | Ft−1) ≤ 0 by Jensen’s inequality, so
ln r˜t is a supermartingale (its integrability follows from that ε˜ ≤ r˜t/r˜t−1 ≤ min(ε, ε˜)−1).
Consequently, using that E τ˜l <∞ and applying Doob’s stopping theorem, we obtain
E ln r˜τ˜l ≤ E
τ˜l∑
s=1
min(f(a)− ln rs−1, 0). (18)
9
The possibility of applying Doob’s theorem can be justified by first applying it to the
bounded stopping times τ˜l ∧ t, then passing to the limit t → ∞ using Fatou’s lemma
in the left-hand side of (18) (note that ln r˜τ˜l∧t is bounded from below by the integrable
random variable τ˜l ln ε˜ + ln r˜0), and using the monotone convergence theorem in the
right-hand side.
Now, similarly to (13), for any c ∈ [ef(a), 1) we find
ln
l
W0
≤ E ln r˜τ˜l + θE τ˜l ≤ E
τ˜l∑
s=1
(f(a)− ln(c))I(rs−1 ≥ c) + θE τ˜l
≤ (θ + f(a)− ln(c)) E τ˜l + (ln c− f(a)) E ηc.
Note that since we consider the case E τ˜l < ∞ for all l > 0, we necessarily have θ +
f(a)− ln(c) > 0. Together with (16), this implies
lim sup
l→∞
E τl
E τ˜l
≤ θ + f(a)− ln c
θ
.
Taking c→ 1, we obtain the claim of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 1. We will assume that λ˜ 6= λ, as otherwise the claim of the
proposition is obvious. SinceWt = ρ
t, for investor 1 we have τl ≥ θ−1 ln l, where θ = ln ρ.
Therefore, it will be enough to show that for investor 2 we have
τ˜l ≤ ln l
θ
(1 + o(1)). (19)
Using the wealth equation (1) and that λn = Rn, we obtain
Y˜t
Y˜t−1
= ρ
N∑
n=1
λ˜nλn
λnrt−1 + λ˜nr˜t−1
. (20)
Inequality (17) implies that rt → 1, so the right-hand side of (20) is strictly greater
than 1 for t large enough. Hence Y˜t → ∞, which implies that τ˜l < ∞ for all l. Conse-
quently,
ln l > ln Y˜τ˜l−1 = lnWτ˜l−1 + ln r˜τ˜l−1 = θ(τ˜l − 1) + ln r˜τ˜l−1. (21)
From (20), using the concavity of the logarithm and the inequality lnx ≥ 1 − x−1, we
obtain the bound
ln
r˜t
r˜t−1
≥
N∑
n=1
λ˜n ln
λn
λnrt−1 + λ˜nr˜t−1
≥ ln r−1t−1 −
N∑
n=1
(λ˜n)2r˜t−1
λnrt−1
≥ r˜t−1
(
1−
N∑
n=1
(λ˜n)2
λnr0
)
,
where in the last inequality we estimated rt−1 ≥ r0 since rt is a non-decreasing sequence
(in the proof of Theorem 1, we showed that it is a submartingale). Since r˜t → 0 and
τ˜l →∞, we get τ˜−1l ln r˜τ˜l → 0. Then relation (21) implies (19), which is what is needed.
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